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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oTATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 19221 
FJCBARD H. NICKLES and 
MAJ;GARET K. NICKLES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Was sufficient evidence presented at tri2l to 
support the jury's finding that defendar.ts were guilty of 
aggravated arson and insurance fraud? 
2. Did the trial court erroneously ad~it evidence of a 
telephone conversation Eileen Rice testified she had with Richard 
1;1ckles after his house burned? 
3. Were defendants denied a fair trial by the 
adc-ission of allegedly inadmissible evidence? 
4. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the 
iury that a conviction for insurance fraud requires more than 
t~ccurate estimates? 
5. Does the existence of an alleged conflict of 
11;terc:st at the time of trial on the pert of the deputy county 
attorney who prosecuted defendants require granting defendants a 
ne~trial? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants, Richard and Margaret Nickles, were charged 
information with aggravated arson, a second desree felony, 
under UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-6-103 (1978), and insurance fraud, a 
second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521 (1978) (R. 
19-22). After a jury trial, defendants were found guilty as 
charged CR. 91-94). 
The trial court sentenced Richard Nickles to a term of 
1-15 years in the Utah State Prison for both aggravated arson and 
insurance fraud, the two sentences to run concurrently. Mr. 
Nickles was also ordered to pay a $10,000 fine for each offense 
and to make restitution to Capitol Thrift and Loan in the amount 
of $63,361.91 (R. 142-143). The court sentenced Mrs. Nickles to 
a term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison for both aggravatEd 
arson and insurance fraud, the two sentences to run concurrently, 
and ordered her to pay a $5,000 fine for aggravated arson and to 
make restitution in the amount of $63,361.91 to Capitol Thrift 
and Loan. However, the court stayed execution of Mrs. Nickles's 
sentence and placed her on conditional Frobation CR. 149-50). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts, which support the jury's verdict, 
are derived from the evidence presented at trial. 
In the early morning hours of October 30, 1980 while 
defendants and their two daughters were away in California, an 
explosion and fire occurred at defendants' residence located on 
Crest Oak Drive in Salt Lake County (R. 275-76, 316-18). Windows 
in a neighbor's house were blown out and glass from defendants' 
house was hurled onto the roofs and into the yards of nearby 
houses (R. 297, 429). The house directly south of defendants' 
was singed by the flames (R. 297). When firemen arrived just 
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~ 1 nutes after the blaze began, defendants' house was engulfed in 
flames (R 276, 398). The fire was extremely hot and very 
difficult to extinguish (R. 306, 402, 406). 
A subsequent investigation of the fire scene by the 
salt Lake County Fire Department and the Arson Task Force of the 
salt Lake County Attorney's Office uncovered evidence of arson. 
JiivEstigators located five points of the fire's origin and 
extensive "pour patterns" (or "trailers")l throughout the house 
IR. 785-86, 843-48, 1057, 1064-67). A "device" consisting of a 
light bulb imbedded in a large amount of newspaper ash with an 
electrical wire running from the base of the light bulb socket to 
an electrical outlet in the wall was found on the floor of a 
basement bedroom belonging to Kimberly Nickles, one of 
defendants' daughters (R. 1067-68). "Trailers" were observed 
which led out of Kimberly's bedroom, into a hallway, continuing 
3ga1n at the top of a set of stairs, into the master bedroom, and 
OJt into an area towards the front of the house (R. 1030-33). 
"Trailers" and "puddle areas•2 were also apparent upstairs in the 
living room area and family room (R. 1033). 
The window and its frame in Kimberly's bedroom had been 
blown out (R. 986). A section of the aluminum frame of a sliding 
door located near the upstairs family room had melted (R. 1059). 
'Pour patterns" or "trailers" were terms used by arson 
investigors to refer to visible signs of a flammable liquid that 
•as present on the floor of the house prior to the fire. 
'Puddle area" was another term used by arson investigators to 
1escribe the visible signs of a flammable liquid referred to in 
tr,utnote l, ~· 
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Investigators found several acetone-soaked suitcases under a 
stairwell in the basement area (R. 978-79, 1075-76, 1178). Pom-
porns that had been hanging in Kimberly's bedroom and pieces of 
drape material were recovered approximately seventy feet fr om the 
back wall of defendants' home (R. 984). Broken glass covered 
defendants' backyard and the neighbor's house and yard <R. 994). 
Dave Magana, a fireman with the Salt Lake County Fire 
Department who had been trained as an arson investigator and who 
coordinated the investigation of the fire at defendants' home (R. 
1054-56), testified that the pour patterns in the house and thE 
melted section of the sliding glass door frame that he observed 
were indications that a flammable liquid had been poured on the 
floor of defendants' house prior to the fire (R. 1059-60, 1064). 
Signs of an explosion that he saw were not consistent with a 
natural gas explosion (R. 1062, 1095) .3 However, he stated that 
a •wet-type" explosion, which is associated with flammable 
liquids, is likely to produce "instant fire of great magnitude" 
(R. 1096). He further identified the "device" found in 
Kimberly's bedroom as one commonly used by arsonists to ignite a 
fire (R. 1075). He distinguished the device frcm a lamp because 
it was found at a point of fire origin and appeared to be wrapped 
in a roll of paper resembling newspaper CR. 1075). 
3 Several other investigators also testified that they saw no 
signs of a natural gas explosion (R. 618, 761-62). Furthermore, 
the testimony of Demoin Christensen, a service foreman for 
Mountain Fuel Supply, and John Ungricht, a battalion chief and 
investigator with the Salt Lake County Fire Department, indicated 
that no signs of swamp gas were observed and that the explosion 
at defendants' residence probably was not caused by swamp gas (R. 
635-38, 819, 831-33, 855). 
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Steve Roberts, a chemist employed with the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF"J having expertise concerning 
[lammable liquids and in the examination of debris from 
suspicious fires (T. 1161-63), testified that his tests on the 
linings from the suitcases recovered in defendants' house 
indicated that a rather large concentration of acetone was 
present CR. 1175, 1178). He observed that acetone vapors could 
cause an explosion, but that acetone is not so volatile that one 
could not pour it around a room or house without causing an 
immediate explosion (R. 1192, 1195). 
Jerry Taylor, an employee of ATF with expertise in 
explosive and incendiary devices, testified that in his 
exa!7lination of the "device" found in Kimberly's bedroor, he 
~'ticed several factors that concernec hh1 as an explosives 
expert (R. 1280-81). Specifically, he noted: 
The aggregate exhibit had some very 
unique i ndi ca tors in it. One of them 
was the placement of a light bulb in and 
around combustible material in the form 
of paper and magazines, which in turn 
was inside of a tray. 
I noticed inunediately that the 
light bulb had some type of stain on it, 
or the glass did, such as you would find 
if you had combustible material and 
maybe flanunable materials burned onto 
the glass itself that would stain. 
I also noticed that the heat had 
caused a formation into the device 
itself. 
In the other exhibit, there was a 
very good outline of a socket--light 
bulb, where the light bulb had been in 
one--had !sic] wasn't broken when it was 
down there and burned for some time and 
melted to cause a recession. I noticed 
wires coming off. They were not broken. 
I couldn't ascertain whether or not they 
were plugged into the socket because 
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other testing had been done by the 
laboratory, but I was told that it had 
been plugged in. 
I noticed that the carpet, as 
said before, around it was burned, but 
when I peeled the device off the carpet 
the carpet was in good shape. That is 
highly unusual for the carpet, if there 
had been a fire and then the device 
falling on it. 
(R. 1281-82). 
Mr. Taylor further testified that from his review of 
the reports of defendants' fire he concluded that "there indeed 
was a violent explosion most probably as a result of flammable 
liquids vaporizing" (R. 1282). The explosion, followed 
immediately by a hot fire which engulfed the entire residence, 
indicated that flammable liquids were burning (R. 1282-83). Mr. 
Taylor stated: 
Having talked to the fire investi-
gators where they noticed several hot 
spots and recognized several flammable 
trailers, this all fit in with the device, 
trailer leading from the device, that's 
one of the points of origin or the 
initial point where the explosion and 
fire started. 
CR. 1283). He concluded that the light bulb object was Pot simply 
a lamp, but rather a device that had been used to start a fire c:nc' 
to burn defendants' residence CR. 1304, 1322). It was the type of 
device that would allow for delayed ignition and thus facilitate 
the creation of an alibi IR. 1307-08). 
Prior to the fire at defendants' home, the following 
occurred. In early July 1980, Dean Larsen, the Fire Marshal and 
Captain of the Murray City Fire Department, visited a busines!: ir. 
the Murray area called Composter Corporation which was operated by 
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Mr. Nickles. He went there in response to a request from Mr. 
~, 1 ckles who was concerned about certain tenants in adjacent 
r"ildings (R.686). Specifically, Nickles told Larsen that he was 
, 0 ncerned that the operators of a particular boat business, who 
were experiencing financial problems, might try to burn down the 
,,uilding that housed their business. Larsen was not aware of any 
;ttempt s by the boat ma nu fact u rer s to burn down that bu il ding. In 
rEspcnse to Nickles' s question to him about what products the boat 
c.anufacturers had in their possession that could be used to set 
fires, Larsen suggested that acetone likely could be used (R. 687-
881. Although he visited Composter Corporation at least five 
times during July and August, Larsen never saw an ongoing business 
tnere--no workers and no office staff CR. 689). 
On August 13, 1980, Capitol Thrift and Loan loaned 
:omposter Corporation $75,000. The note was signed by defendants 
.ndividually and by Mr. Nickles as president of the corporation. 
~fendants' home was put up as security for the loan. The 
Lepayment schedule consisted of six monthly i11terest payments of 
s_,375 each, the principle to accompany the sixth payment CR. 641-
43, 651). Defendants' check for the first payment, which was 
received October 2, 1980, bounced. A second check from defendants 
>as also returned; however, defendants were able to provide an 
explanation for why this occurred CR. 646-47, 655-56). At the 
time of defendants' trial, the loan company had received only 
'l 375 in payments from defendants on the outstanding note CR. 
; '). 
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At various times during 1980, defendants' house was U[, 
for sale CR. 525, 529). Alice Blair, a real estate agent for 
Century 21, testified that she had the house listed from October 
3-30 of that year for a price of $239,000, but had not shown it to 
anyone or had any interested buyers CR. 513, 525). Another real 
estate agent, who had defendants' house listed earlier in the 
year, similarly had no offers or inquiries on the home CR. 557-
59). For the period that Ms. Blair had the hoLse listed, ~rs. 
Nickles declined to give her a key to it because Mrs. Nickles 
claimed that a complex burglar alcrm system had bee!' installed (R. 
517). However, Ms. Blair never saw such a system CR. 519). Also, 
she was unable to arrange an or€ri house for defendants' home, 
although she attempted to do this with Mrs. Nickles on at least 
four successive weekends, including the weekend defendants were to 
be in California CR. 518). 
Defendants had always maintained an expensive 
•cadillac• insurance policy on their home CR. 928). In December 
1978, coverage on the house was $150,000. By September 1979, 
built-in inflation allowances had increased it to $165,000. In 
January 1980, pursuant to defendants' request, coverage was 
increased to $250,000 (R. 946-48). This increase apparently was 
requested to account for refurbishing of the home CR. 967). In 
early October 1980, Mrs. Nickles contacted her agent at 
Transwestern Insurance Agency and requested that a "rider" for 
silverware be placed on defendants' policy CR. 944, 952, 968). 
Per that request, a silver rider in the amount of $17 ,280 becar,e 
effective on October 10, 1980 (R. 923, 952). Agents at the 
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1nsurance company never saw the silver or received an a ppr ai sal on 
1t !R. 922, 956). Several days before October 30, the date of the 
fne, Margaret Nickles, her two daughters, and the family's two 
~gs left in defendants' station wagon for a trip to California 
iR. 1865-67). Richard Nickles planned to fly to southern 
ialifornia later and meet his family in Santa Maria after he 
attended a business meeting in Los Angeles (R. 1866). 
On the evening of October 28, Mr. Nickles telephoned 
cinda Dickert, a neighbor, and told her that he had a casserole he 
wished to give her because he would be leaving at noon the next 
day to join his family in California (R. 312-13). When Ms. 
Dickert' s fourteen-year-old son, David, went over to defendants' 
nouse to pick up the casserole, he found it sitting on a flower 
box (R. 316, 356-57). He did not go into the house, but saw Mr. 
1 Nickles through a window by the front door when Mr. Nickles told 
n1m where the casserole was (R. 357). David also observed one of 
defendants' cars with its trunk open backed up in the driveway 
approximately ten feet from a door (R. 358-59). However, he did 
not see or smell anything unusual at the time (R. 358-59). 
>ever al days before the fire, David had spoken with Mrs. Nickles 
to make arrangements for the care of defendants' cat while they 
were away (R. 355). Although defendants had previously given him 
a key to the house when he cared for their pets, on this occasion 
they did not give him a key and instead placed the cat's food and 
bowls outside the front door (R. 356). 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on October 29 when Ms. 
', 1ckert was about to go to bed, she noticed that the lights were 
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on in nearly every room of defendants' house. However, she did 
not see any movement or activity in the house (R. 315). Ms. 
Dickert also testified that she had heard defendants talk about 
acetone in connection with their business, that she had seen a 
gallon container of acetone in defendants' home, and that Mrs. 
Nickles had offered to lend her acetone, saying that she had it by 
the barrelful (R. 322-23, 337-38). 
On the morning of the fire at approximately 8:00 a.m., 
John Minichino, a special agent for ATF and a member of the Salt 
Lake County Special Arson Fire Enforcement Unit, contacted Mr. 
Nickles in California and told him about the explosion and fire at 
defendants' residence. Mr. Nickles first inquired whether anyone 
had been hurt or killed (R. 720-21). However, when asked by 
Minichino to return to Salt Lake City, Mr. Nickles responded, 
"What the fuck do I have to come back [to Salt Lake City] for 
now?" (R. 742l. He indicated that he would not be back in Salt 
Lake City until November 1, 1980, and that he would be driving 
back with his family (R. 721). 
Defendants arrived back in Salt Lake City at 
approximately 12:30 a.m. on November 2. Mr. Minichino interviewed 
Mr. Nickles the following day (R. 721, 724). In that interview, 
Mr. Nickles indicated that he left Salt Lake City for California 
on Wednesday, October 29, at 11:50 a.m. Only two families knew 
about his travel plans, and no one had been given keys to the 
house <R. 726). Al though the house had been on the market in the 
past one and one-half years and as recently as three or four 
months prior to the fire, none of the realtors had keys to the 
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nouse. The real estate companies had been informed that a burglar 
alarm system had been installed, al though such a system had not 
0
ctually been hooked up (R. 731-32). Certain valuables had been 
removed from the house due to fears of a possible burglary. 
Personal papers and birth certificates had been taken out of a 
house vault and some sterling silver placed inside (R. 728-30). 
~uring the interview, Mr. Nickles also mentioned that gasoline 
could not have been used to start the fire, and asked Minichino 
whether a timing device had been found (R. 725). 
On December 30, 1980, defendants submitted a proof-of-
!oss statement of between 100 and 200 pages in making a claim to 
the Great American Insurance Company, the company with which 
defendants had a homeowner's insurance policy (R. 458, 865-66, 
'.428). The proof-of-loss statement, which listed approximately 
1700 items, made a claim of $233,353.29 for the house, $134,000 
:or contents, $53,600 for loss of use, $12,876 for silver, $3,800 
for fur, $6,500 for landscape, and $360 for other structures (R. 
553,1378). 
Aaron Nelson, an attorney who took sworn statements 
crom defendants on behalf of Great American Insurance Company in 
connection with the proof of loss statement defendants submitted, 
'estified that Mr. Nickles indicated to him that on the date of 
the fire he was not employed (R. 1374-76, 1379). Prior to the 
fire, Mr. Nickles had a number of jobs including recent ownership 
ot Compost er Corporation; however, that company had never made any 
'ales and had never received any income. Mrs. Nickles maintained 
tnat she sold a number of bins for the company, but that she had 
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no idea of how much income had been earned CR. 1380-81). Mrs. 
Nickles apparently was not employed in any capacity for at least 
nine years prior to the fire CR. 1384). Although Mr. Nickles 
claimed he never had a checking account, Mrs. Nickles indicated 
that she had one and that she had purchased nearly every item 
listed in the proof-of-loss statement CR. 1393). 
Mr. Nelson could not recall receiving a single receipt 
for any of the items defendants claimed were lost in the fire CR. 
1387). Specifically, he never received any proofs of purchase for 
the Grand Baroque sterling silverware defendants claimed had been 
lost CR. 1392). Nor was he ever shown any silver, although 
defendants indicated that six of the twelve place settings of 
silverware they owned had been removed from a vault in the house 
after the fire CR. 1392, 1399, 1449). Both defendants claimed 
that the silverware had been purchased at ZCMI, Cottonwood Mall 
(R. 1400). 
Calvin Miller, an insurance adjuster with General 
Adjustment Bureau Can independent insurance adjusting firm), 
testified that he met with several people, including defendants, 
on March 31 and April 1, 1981, to inspect defendants' house CR. 
1499-1501). He was there to assist in verifying the personal 
property items listed by defendants in their claim to the 
insurance company CR. 1503). He specifically looked for silver, 
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but found none (R. 1512). 4 He observed an empty floor safe in 
which defendants claimed to have stored some their silverware, but 
defendants never showed him any of that silverware CR. 1514-15). 
Miller did not see any business records or cancelled checks in the 
debris CR. 1509). Although there was evidence that some items 
claimed by defendants had actually existed, such as various pieces 
of furniture in the master bedroom, numerous items of the greatest 
value were not found and were frequently said by defendants to 
have been in areas where the fire had burned most intensely CR. 
i513l. Also, no signs of silver spoons, a coin collection, or 
iewelry items allegedly located in Kimberly's bedroom were found 
IR. 1506). 
Mark Ingersoll, another employee of General Adjustment 
Bureau who was at the scene of the fire on March 31 and April 1, 
testified that at best only fifty per cent of the items claimed by 
defendants in their proof-of-loss statement were located (R. 1622-
24, 1647). For example, he was unable to find any signs of 
leather or fur items, silverware, camera equipment, or binoculars 
:P. 1627-29, 1633). However, he thought that a silver tray was 
recovered, and he remembered seeing the remains of an oil painting 
ar.d what appeared to be an expensive fireplace set (R. 1643, 1650-
511. 
4 
Fire investigators who were on the scene shortly after the fire 
•as extinguished were also unable to locate any silver items or 
silverware (R. 379, 422, 597, 776-77, 1036-38). One fireman 
testified that some utensils were found, but they appeared to be 
silver plate or stainless steel (R. 399-400, 417). 
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James Ashby, an investigator with the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office at the time of defendants' fire, visited the 
three ZCMI stores in the Salt Lake City area and examined their 
sales records for any record of silverware purchases made by 
defendants. After searching through "thousands" of records, he 
could find no evidence of such purchases {R. 1588-92). Also, 
several witnesses from various furniture and appliance stores in 
the Salt Lake City area testified that they were unable to find 
any records of purchases by defendants of several major items 
defendants claimed in their proof-of-loss statement {R. 1544-85, 
1594-1621). 
At trial, defendants presented a number of witnesses. 
Four expert witnesses gave testimony intended to rebut the State's 
evidence that the light bulb object found in Kimberly's bedroom 
was a device designed to start a fire and that a flammable 
liquid--acetone--which had been poured on the floor of defendants' 
house prior to the fire had contributed to the explosion and fire 
{R. 1725-43, 1747-1804, 1816-38, 2115-37). Seven witnesses were 
called who generally testified as to their knowledge of the 
contents of defendants' home prior to the fire (R. 1839-1973, 
1980-2049). 
Mrs. Nickles also took the stand at trial. She 
generally testified that prior to the fire defendants were not 
experiencing financial difficulties <R. 2185-86), that she was 
shocked to hear about the fire {R. 2187), that defendants did not 
have large quantities of acetone in their house <R. 2198), that 
although she believed the fire was started intentionally, neither 
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she nor Mr. Nickles nor her daughters started the fire (R. 2187, 
1266), and finally, that she was under a great deal of pressure to 
0,-,mplete the proof-of-loss statement required by the insurance 
company as part of defendants' claim (R. 2077-80). She admitted 
that she told the real estate agent that a key to defendants' home 
was not available because of an alarm system, even though such a 
si'stem had not actually been installed (R. 2063-64). She also 
acknowledged that there was "probably a half barrel or so of" 
acetone at defendants' boat business (R. 2215). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State presented sufficient evidence at trial from 
~hich the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that an arson 
~curred at defendants' residence, that defendants were 
responsible for the arson, and that defendants committed insurance 
fraud. 
Because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence 
from which the jury could conclude that a telephone call received 
ey Eileen Rice was placed by Richard Nickles, the trial court 
~operly admitted the contents of that telephone conversation into 
evidence. 
Because the tiral court did not commit error with 
respect to the admission of certain testimony and the asking of 
certain questions by the prosecutor, or, at most, committed 
harmless error in that regard, defendants are not entitled to a 
ne~ trial based upon the individual or cumulative effect of 
•oous evidentiary errors they allege occurred. 
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The trial court did not err in refusing to give 
defendants' requested jury instruction concerning estimates and 
the offense of insurance fraud. The substance of defendants' 
instruction was given in one of the court's jury instructions. 
Although there was an appearance of a conflict of 
interest on the part of the prosecutor who prosecuted defendants' 
case, defendants are not entitled to a new trial. They fail to 
show any actual prejudice, the standard that must be met given the 
context in which the conflict of interest issue was raised. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
Defendants argue that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's verdict. 
Specifically, they contend that the evidence was insufficient to 
support any one of three findings that the jury necessarily made: 
Cl) that an arson occurred, (2) that defendants were responsible 
for the arson, if there actually was an arson, and (3) that 
defendants committed insurance fraud. Each of these points will 
be dealt with separately. 
A. 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-103 Cl978), the statute the 
jury found defendants had violated, "!al person is guilty of 
aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages a habitable 
structure(.]" Defendants first argue that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that an arson occurred at their home. However, 
-16-
in arguing this point, defendants ignore several well established 
eunciples of appellate review regarding sufficiency of evidence 
,111 est ions. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a conviction, this Court has applied the 
following standard of review: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, and will only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable man could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We also view in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict those 
facts which can be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence presented to it. 
State y. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) (citations 
omitted). And, the trier of fact is not obligated to believe the 
evidence most favorable to the defendant rather than that 
presented in opposition by the State. State y. Howell, 649 P.2d 
91, 97 (Utah 1982). 
As noted in this brief's statement of facts, 
substantial evidence was presented by the State from which the 
Jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
arson had occurred. Fire investigators testified that they 
observed evidence of a flammable liquid explosion, multiple 
points of fire origin, pour patterns and puddle areas indicative 
of flammable liquids having been poured on the floor of the house 
prior to the fire, and a light bulb object on the floor in a 
downstairs bedrocsn experts later identified as a device commonly 
' 5ed by arsonists. Fire investigators and explosive experts 
cest1fied that the explosion was not consistent with a natural 
1as explosion and likely was not caused by swamp gas. 
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Defendants ignore substantial, credible evidence 
presented by the State, which contradicted evidence they 
presented at trial, and ask the Court to view the evidence in a 
light most favorable to a conclusion contrary to the jury's 
verdict. Moreover, they note testimony given by their expert 
witnesses at trial without even acknowledging that directly 
contradictory testimony on many of the questions was given by the 
State's expert witnesses. For example, defendants contend that 
there was no evidence that the light bulb object found in 
Kimberly's bedroom was set up as a device to start a fire. 
Appellants' Brief at 18. However, the State presented evidence 
that the object was found in a severely burned area with 
flammable liquid •trailers" leading away from the area and that 
the light bulb portion was embedded in ash which suggested that 
the bulb had been wrapped in paper similar to newspaper. 
Defendants' contention that 450 to 2,250 gallons of 
acetone would have been necessary to cause the explosion that 
occurred in defendants' home, Appellants' Brief at 19, similarly 
ignores contradictory evidence presented by the State. The 
testimony of Steve Roberts, an ATF chemist, that a minimum of 
several gallons of flammable liquid would be necessary to cause 
an explosion in a house suggested that the 450 to 2,250 gallon 
estimate made by a defense witness was much too high CR. 1189). 
In sum, defendants' sweeping statement that "it is clear that 
!the explosion and fire) was not caused as the State theorized," 
and that •the defense experts' testimony was unrebutted," 
Appellant's Brief at 19, simply is not accurate. 
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B. 
Second, defendants argue that even if there was 
0 ufficient evidence to show that an arson occurred, the State 
~esented insufficient evidence to prove that defendants 
committed the arson. In making this claim, defendants ignore two 
well-settled rules: (1) that circumstantial evidence alone may be 
rornpetent to establish the guilt of the accused, State y, 
~· 646 P.2d 723, 725 !Utah 1982), and !2) that this Court 
will view in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict those 
facts that can be reasonably inferred from the evidence presented 
Le it. fil.;lte y, Mccardell, 652 P.2d at 945. 
The information filed against defendants charged that 
they "by means of fire and/or explosion intentionally and 
unlawfdly damaged a habitable strLJcture, or that acting with the 
required mental state for the commission of [aggravated arson] 
die solicit, request, comrr.and, encourage, or intentionally aid 
ar:c•ther person to engage in conduct to damage said habitable 
structLJre ..•• " ("Information" (R. 19) (Appendix All. ~ 
CTl,H CCDE Nm. § 76-2-202 (1978). Thus, the jury could have 
found deferic'C<Tts guilty of aggrave.tec' c-.rsor> if it concluded that 
they either directly committed the offense or aided its 
conr:-.ission. £.e.e Instructions Nos. 15 and 16 (R. 79-80) !Appendix 
Bl· The jury had before it considerable circumstantial evidence, 
outlined in this brief' s statement of facts, frorr. which it cotild 
have reasonably concluded that defendants were responsible for 
'l:e arson, either on a theory of direct commission of the offense 
~r a theory of aiding the commission of the offense. This case 
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is not like ~y. Linden, 666 P.2d 875 (Utah 1983), where Ui: 
Court held that sufficient evidence was not ad0uceo at trial to 
tie the defendant to the arson. 
From the State's evidence, which, as with many arsor1 
cases, was nearly all circumstrr1tial, the jury could have 
reasonably inferred the following facts. Defendants were 
experiencing serious financial problems and planned to burn down 
their house to alleviate those problems. Mrs. Nickles declineC: 
to give the real estate people a key to the house and lied to 
them about a burglar alarm system because she did not war1t ther 
to have access to the house while rrq.<1ratic•ns fer the fire wer< 
beins made. For the same reason, she did not give a key tc th· 
neighbor boy who was to care fer the cat. Mrs. Nickles traveled 
to California with her two darshters and the farnily' s dogs two 
days prior to the fire in croer to set up an alibi for herself. 
On the evening prior to Mr. Nickles's departure for California, 
he put the casserole outside the front door for the neighbor boy 
to pick up because he did not wish to have the boy come inside 
the house. Nearly all the lights were on in defendants' house at 
approximately 3:00 a.m. the morning Mr. Nickles left for 
California because he was preparing for the fire. Acetone, large 
quantities of which Mrs. Nickles told a neighbor defendants had 
access to and which was found in heavy concentrations in the 
linings of suitcases discovered in defendants' house after the 
fire, was poured by Mr. Nickles around the l•CL'SE to accelerate 
the fire once it was started by the light bulb device located in 
Kimberly's bedroom. Mr. Nickles left for California 
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~pproximately thirteen hours prior to the fire in order to set up 
'"alibi for himself. Defendants did not rush back from 
~11fornia after being informed about the fire because they were 
"ol suq'rised by its occurrence. 
c. 
Finally, defendants argue that the State's evidence was 
, 0 sufficient to support their convictions of insurance fraud. 
They were charged under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521 (1978) with 
Etther directly committing insurance fraud or aiding its 
cc~~ issior. ("Information" (R. 19) (Appendix Al; Instructior. No. 
18 (R. 82) (AFpendix Bl l. Section 76-6-521 provides: 
Every person who presents, or causes to 
be presented, any false or fraudulent 
claim, or any proof in s~pport of any 
such claim, upon any contract of 
insurance for the payment of any loss, 
or who prepares, makes or s~bscribes 
any account, certificate of survey, 
affidavit or proof of loss, or other 
book, paper or writing, with intent to 
present or use the same, or to allow 
it to be presented or used, in support 
of any such claim is punishable as in 
the manner prescribed for theft of 
property of like value. 
In closing argument at trial, the State focused on 
fever al i terns regarding the charge of ir,surc>.nc~ fraud, including 
~efendants' claim for $12,258 in sterling silverw;;;re and the 
~a~s defendants submitted for reconstruction of their house (R. 
2351-53). In reviewing the evidence concerning those two itens 
'lone, it canrot be said that a reasonable person could not 
~sFibly have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants had 
'.lated § 76-6-521. During a thcrough search of the debris 
·''<.r the fire, investigators and firemen were unable to find any 
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sterling silverware of the type claimed by defendants. The store 
from which the Eilverware had allegedly been purchased had no 
records of sales of silverware to defendants. Defendants n~v~r 
showed any of the reE'aining six place settings of silverware tt.c· 
allegedly recovered after the fire from a floor vault in the 
house. The plans defendants subr.iitted to the insurcince cor.1pany 
for reconstruction of their house included three items--an 
intercom system, a telephone switch syster,1, and a burglar alam 
system Call items Mr. Nickles told the person wto prepared the 
blueprints were in the house prior to the firel--which, the 
evidence showed, were not in the house prior to the fire. Mrs. 
Nickles herself testified that the hou~e did not have a burglar 
alarm system or an intercom systerr. CR. 2064, 2261). 
In sum, under the standards for review of an 
insufficiency of evidence claim set forth by this Court, the 
State presented sufficient evidence to support defendants' 
convictions of aggravated arson and insurance fraud. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
OF A TELEPHONE CALL RECEIVED BY EILEEN RICE 
FROM A PERSON WfiO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS 
DICK NICKLES, THE DEFENDANT. 
Defendants argue that the trial court erroneously 
admitted evidence of a telephone call received by Eileen Rice, a 
secretary for ATF, from a person who identified himself as Dick 
Nickles, the defendant. Ms. Rice testified that on November lD, 
1980, she received a call from a person who identified himself a' 
Dick Nickles CR. 14921. Ms. Rice related the following about the 
telephone conversation: 
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He was askins about some articles that 
had been remove6 fror his hon.e and then 
mentioned to me that there had been a 
suspected arson at his horr.e <r.c:i that he had 
been suspect lsicl of it and commented that 
wasn't it lucky he had been 800 r' iles away 
with the Secretary of the Department of 
Energy and that he would have needed a very 
long fuse or a time delay. 
Then, he again came back to the fact 
that these articles were missing and I asked 
what was missing and he said some silverware 
and other things, whole drawers full. And I 
told him I didn't believe we had them and 
that he said possibly they hac been removed 
for safekeeping. 
I told him that I didn't think we had 
them, but that I would have John Minichino 
call when he got back to the office. 
'R, 1493-94). The court adr,,itted this evidence over defendants' 
o~ection that the identity of the caller had not been 
sufficiently established. Ms. Rice acln~ttec on cross-exarr.ination 
tr,at she had never met Mr. Nickles and probably had not heard his 
"01ce before the telephone call CR. 1495). 
The general rule in this country is that the identity 
·fa telephcr.e c<>ller may be established by circumstantial 
f1;ou.ce. State y. Panielson, 37 Wash. App. 469, 471, 681 P.2d 
i60, 261 (Wash. App. 1984); State v. J:l~i.lilIJ, 185 Mont. 522, 533-
i4, 605 P.2d 1121, 1128 (1980), ~ ~. 447 U.S. 924; Annot., 
·9 A.L.R. 3d 79 (1977). As noted in State v._~: 
Where the recipient of a call is not 
familiar with the cc:ller' s voice, "!cl or-
roboration of a statement of identity by 
the caller sufficient to render the 
conversation admissible against him may 
be supplied by evidence (1) that the 
subject matter of the call revealed that 
only the named party would likely have 
knowledge of those conversational facts 
f; olr (2) of other confirr;-,ing circum-
stances which make it probable that the 
named per~on was, in fact, the speaker." 
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!Ci ta ti ons omitted. l State v. Marlar 
<1972), 94 Idaho 803, 498 P.2d 1276, 1281. 
605 P.2d at 1128. "In order to adequately identify the party 
against whom the evidence is sought to be introduced, the 
circumstance, even though slight, must at leaEt tend to ide~tify 
the party as the caller.• State v • .ilQ.Il.£..r, 94 Idaho 803, 808, 498 
P.2d 1276, 1281 (1972). And, if sufficient proof is ir,troduced tG 
permit a reasonable trier of fact to fincl in favor of 
identification, the identification requirement is rret. State: v. 
Danielrnn, 681 P.2d at 261. ~~Utah R. Evici. 90l(b) (~) and 
90l(bl (6) (Supp. 1984). During the telephone conversation with 
Ms. Fice, tt.e caller disclcsed knowleGge of several facts that 
likely would be known only to RicharG Nickles, er someone in hiE 
family--e.g., that he was 800 rriles awey froro Salt Lake City 
meeting with the Secretary of the Department of Energy c.nc th2t 
some silverware ar'Forently was missing. Under the standards set 
forth above, this was sufficient proof of identification. The 
trial court therefore properly admitted Ms. Rice's testimony 
concerning the telephone conversation. 
POUJT III 
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW 
TRIAL BASED UPON THE INDIVIDUAL AND 
CUMULl'.TIVE EFFECT OF ALLE'GEDLY It:FkOHR 
ADMISSION OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE. 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new trial 
because the trial court, on numerous occasions, erroneously 
admitted evidence. These errors, they contend, require reversal 
due to both their individual and cumulative effect. Defendant~ 
have identified eight evidentiary categories under which the 
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-
11Jeged errors are grouped. Each of these categories will be 
addressed separately. 
A. 
Defendants first contend that the trial court erred in 
,])owing irrelevant testimony over their objections. Although 
:c,st of the identified instances of alleged error are reviewable, 
,,frr.dants appear to have waived any error regarding admission of 
testimony concerning flammable liquids other than acetone and 
insurance coverage for the rebuildir.g of a garage {R. 870, 1312) .s 
fr,is is so because they failed to make o timely objection to that 
t2~tir.ony at trial. ~ .fil.2,te y. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 
!l'tah 1982) (the contemporaneocs cl:,jection rule rec:uires timely 
;~d specific objection to the admission of evidence in order for 
tr.e question of admissibility to be considered on appeal). 
Defense counsel's objection to the testimony referred to above wao 
1 :,ot made until after the witness's answer was already in {R. 870, 
1:!2l. In general, counsel is not allowed to gamble upon the 
~cssibili ty of a favorable answer, but must object to the 
a~ission of evidence as soon as the ground for objection becomes 
0Horrnt. CLEARY, McCORtHCK ON EVIDENCE § 52, at 126 <1984). 
'Whrn [defense counsel] has been made fully aware of the response 
o'.ilch a question is bound to elicit, he should Object When the 
;~est1on is asked, rather than delay with the hope of inviting 
error and laying the foundation for a mistrial.• United States v .. 
3 
Defendants cite T. 1101 {R. 1321) as a point in the transcript 
~here inadmissible testimony of flammable liquids other than 
0 cetone was received. However, the flammable liquid mentionec by 
:he witness was not identified. 
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Armedo-Satmiento, 545 F.2d 785, 795 (2d Cir. 1976), ~. ~. 
430 U.S. 917 (1977). 
As for the testimony concerning lights that were on in 
nearly every room of defendants' house at 3:00 a.m. on the mornin'j 
of Mr. Nickles's departure for California, the casserole picked up 
from defendants' house by a neighbor boy, and estimates for 
rebuilding defendan~s' home in Arizona, defendants' claim that 
admission of that allegedly irrelevant evidence Cto which they 
made timely objection at trial) requires reversal, is without 
merit. That evidence was relevant to proving material facts 
underlying the alleged arson--i.e., motive and opportunity--and 
thus was admissible under Utah R. Evid. 1(2) Cl977J which defines 
"relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency in reason to 
prove or disprove the existence of any material fact.• .s..e_e .al..s.Q 
Utah R. Evid. 402 (Supp. 1984) (the current rule). Moreover, the 
trial court is given broad discretion in conducting a trial, 
particularly in the matter of receiving evidence. State y. 
Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1977). In determining whether 
evidence is relevant, the trial court should be accorded a large 
measure of discretion and should be reversed only if it abuses 
that discretion. ~ Martin v. Safeway, 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 <Utah 
1977). A review of the evidence referred to above reveals no such 
abuse. 
Finally, although there may be some question as to the 
relevance of the testimony about the proximity of Mr. Nickles's 
business to Deseret Industries, any error in the admission of that 
evidence was harmless. There simply is no reasonable likelihood 
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that withcut the error there would have been a differer:t result in 
orfendants' trial. State y. Hut~, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 
!982); Utah R. Evid. 4 <1977) (the current comparable rule is Utah 
R, Ev id. 103 (al (Supp. 1984) l; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-30 (a) 
i 198:0) • 
B. 
Defendants claim that inadmissible hearsay evidence was 
irproperly admitted at trial when Jerry Taylor, an ATF expert on 
explosives, was allowed to testify about hEcarsay which provideC: 
the basis for his expert testimony. Specifically, they point to 
Taylor's te< tir.;or.::,1 regarding inforr.1ation on the circUI!'stances of 
t~e fire thc:t one of the investigators of defendants' fire 
f'rovided him (R. 1282). However, this claim ignores the purpose 
for which the information from the investigator was offered. It 
'as not offered fer the truth of the information provided, but as 
i~form2tion relied upon by Taylor in givins expert testimony. The 
~earsay testimony was necessary to establish a foundation for 
Taylor's expert opinion and thus was properly admitted. State y. 
~. Utah, __ P.2d __ , No. 18998, slip op. at 16 <filed 
December 31, 1984). As noted by the Court in~' "an expert 
':tness in a civil or criminal case may rely on hearsay matter if 
it is the kind of information that experts in the subject matter 
•ould regularly rely upon." ~. slir, op. at 16 n. 16, .tilin.g 
fu.li y. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725-26 (Utah 1982). 
Stgni f icantly, defendants do not argue that the inf orma ti on from 
:r,~ investigator is not the kind of informe<tion regularly relied 
'eon by expE-rts such as Taylor. 
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c. 
A prerequisite to the admission of a witness's 
testimony is that the witness have personal knowledge of the 
matter as to which he or she is going to testify. Utah R. Evid. 
29 !197711 Utah R. Evid. 602 (Supp. 19841; State v. Jones, 656 
P.2d 1012, 1014 (Utah 19821. Defendants contend that Mark Brown, 
vice-president of the corporation that runs Carriage House, was 
allowed to testify about store sales records although he had no 
personal knowlege of the contents of those records (R. 1594-1616). 
The trial transcript appears to support this claim (R. 16091. 
However, defendants are not in a position to argue that the trial 
court erred in this regard. Al though they moved to strike Mr. "' 
Brown's testimony when it became apparent that he lacked the fl 
necessary personal knowledge to testify about the sales records, ~:1 
they failed to request a ruling on their motion after the trial ,, 
judge indicated that he was taking the motion under advisement (R. 
1610, 16141. Under these circumstances, the Court should not 
consider defendants' assignment of error. 
D. 
Defendants argue that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error when, in six separate instances, it overruled 
defendants' objections to questions that allegedly assumed facts 
not in evidence. Although it is generally accepted that a 
question is objectionable if it assumes facts not in evidence, 
~State y. Weese, 424 A.2d 705, 709 n. 4, (Me. 198111 State v. 
hn.e..J::, 273 S.C. 646, 654-55, 258 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1979), a review 
of the questions defendants challenge reveals no clear 
-28-
nJation of this general rule, at least as to most of the 
r-Jlenged questions. And, even for those questions th<lt rr_ay have 
,ccr' objectionable, if the trial court's refusal to sustain 
idendants' objections to them was error, it was at most harmless 
e''or. It was harmless because there is no reasonable likelihood 
•r, 0 t in U'E absence of the error there would have been a different 
,,_,ult in defendants' trial. State y. Hutchison, 655 P.2d at 636; 
Ii\11 CODE AFt:. § 77-35-30 (a) (1982). 
The prosecutor's questions to Ms. Rice regar~ing a 
'.oiq:.hone convcrsution she had 1<;itt: a r,erscn who ic<cl'tified 
'_rsElf as Dick Nickles were phrased in such a way as not to 
"'sune that Mr. Nickles was uncontrovertedly the caller. The 
;rosecutor used the phrase "the person purporting to be Mr. 
::ickles" when asking his questions, after the trial court 
:,:tainEd an objectior. to the forn, of cr.e question wr.ich assumed 
-.'.ct tUre was r.o doubt that Mr. Nickles was the caller (R. 1492-
;;1, Thus, defendants assignment of error in this regard lacks 
Defendants' contention that the prosecutor's question 
·r ~:ark Brown, an e111ployee of Carriage House, concernins 
"''cr.dants' possible purchase of a dresser from Carriage House 
0' 0wred facts r.ct in evidence (R. 1603), similarly is without 
rci1t. As noted by the trial judge in ruling upon the propriety 
:'.the question, Mr. Nelson, the atto;::ney who took stater-1ents frorr, 
·-:enJantc; for the insurance company, had previocsly testified 
"' the ~-roof-of-loss statement submitted by defendants listed 
iture items purchased from Carriage House (R. 1402, 1602). 
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Nor was there any error regarding the prosecutor's 
question to a witness who had hung draperies for defendants about 
whether the draperies could be used in another house (R. 1956). 
Defendants claim the question impermissibly assumed that 
defendants intended to take the draperies to a new house. 
Although the question is arguably only marginally acceptable, it 
appears to have been proper in that evidence of defendants' desire 
to move to Phoenix had previously been introduced (R. 1912). 
Defendants have not shown that it was improper to allow 
the prosecutor to ask one witness about whether trailers used to 
relocate Mr. Nickles's mother were listed in defendants' proof-of-
loss statement. There was a dispute at trial when the question 
was asked as to whether the statement actually listed the trailers 
(R. 1997-98). The statement was not made a part of the record on 
appeal, and therefore defendants' assertion that they are unable 
to find any such entry on the statement cannot be verified. Under 
these circumstances, this Court cannot rule on whether the 
prosecutor's question assumed facts not in evidence. State y, 
Wylffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Utah 1982), ~ ~. 460 
U.S. 1044 (1983). 
Admittedly, two of the prosecutor's questions present 
some difficulties. His question to Lynette Daniels about whether 
defendants had ever spilled a large quantity of acetone in their 
suitcases and his question about "backup" devices used to cause a 
fire, in the context in which they were asked, were probably at 
best marginally acceptable. However, as noted above, any error in 
allowing those questions to be asked was harmless. 
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E. 
Defendants note three points during their trial where 
-e 0 timony allegedly beyond an expert witness's expertise was 
etconeously admitted. They claim that Olin Yearby should not have 
~een allowed to testify about sources of ignition, that Aaron 
Nelson's testimony regarding insurance coverage was improper, and 
that Iraj Aalam should not have been forced to answer a question 
on feel-air explosions. Each of these claims is without merit. 
At page 1609 (R. 1837) of the trial transcript, where 
defendants claim Mr. Aalam was forced to answer a question on 
fuel-air explosions, no such answer appears. In fact, no such 
answer was ever given (R. 1837-38). The prosecutor withdrew his 
;Jestion after the court sustained an objection to the form of the 
question (R. 1838). 
As for the challenged testimony of Mr. Yearby, the 
trial court could have reasonably concluded that the testimony was 
within the scope of the witness's expertise, who testified that he 
~a] received arson investigation training from the National Fire 
~cademy in Emmitsburg, Maryland (R. 578-79). It is well settled 
that the suitability of expert testimony in a particular case and 
•ne qualification of the proposed expert are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. State y. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 
'ib lUtah 1982). As noted in Clayton: 
In State y. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 
865 (1959), this Court held that where it 
appeared to the trial court that there was 
a reasonable foundation for the opinion 
of the expert witness, it was within the 
discretion of the court to admit the 
opinion and allow any frailties therein 
to be exposed on cross-examination. 
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"The faults in it . . go to its ~eight 
r a the r th a r to i t s core, le >e t ency . " 
10 Utah 2d at 38, 347 P.2d at 868. 
646 P. 2d at 726. 
Finally, the trial court could bave reasonably 
determined that ~r. Kelson was qualified to tlstify about "loE: , 
use" provisions ir, insurance policie2. Mr. NelH•r• test if iec the. 
he had experience as an attorney in litigatir.g these tyi:-es of 
provisions (R. 1386). Thus, under the Clarton standaro, the re 
appears to have been no atuse of discrt:ctior. by the court ir, 
allowing Mr. Nelson to give the testimony challer.ged by 
defendants. 
F. 
Defendants contend that the trial court erroneously 
allowed several witnesses to answer questior.s f:-<:s<=d by the 
proseCL:t or tr.cit c21led for a speculative respor.se. It is cleeir 
that que.ctions callins for a purely speculative response fror, a 
witness are improper. ~~-1:·L::.ll, 370 So.2d J C7C, 1074 
<Ala. Cr. App. 1979). Although the tricl court apt,ears to hcvc 
erred in this regard, a re\iew cf the irnpro1~r questions 
ideritified by defendants indicates that the errors were harr,less. 
State v. Hutchison, 655 P.26 at 636; UTAH CODE r.n;. § 77-35-JOlal 
<1982). 
G. 
Defendants argue that the trial court should have 
granted their motion to strike an unresponsive answer given t•y c•, 
of the State's expert witnesses. Generally, it is not per sc 
error to admit into evidence testimony that may be unresponsive, 
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it le rflevc.T1t for sorr,e puq::ose . .£e.9.1-l~Y~-lla~, 183 Colo. 
, 184-85, 517 P. 2d 461, 465 ( 1973). When objection is made to 
i:r '" f·C·r•sive answer, the triill cc,urt may perr1t the testir7.ony 
""nd or may grant a motion to strike, the deterr;iinat1ve test 
ti1e- mntior. to strike being whether the ar1swcr would unduly 
'"Ju!Cice one of the rarties. Rice v. l'.i~.f', 603 P.2d 1125, 1130 
,:. 1979). Although the ans1-•er given by the State's witness 
·rttedly was unresic·nEive, defendants f«il to sho"'' that the 
,u w2' CC!7Fletely irrelevant or tr,<l it weo unduly prejuC:icial 
tr, err .• 
H. 
DefePdants identify four "argumentative" qLestions they 
.ege the trial court ir,1prq.-erly allowed the rrosecutor to ask. 
·,,.·,er, only three of those questions are subject to review. 
,f,:r.dcnts have providec no record citation for the qucst1or: 
:.q crteC:ly asked of one witness concerning a motion to compel 
c,\cry by dEfendants. Thus, the Court hoE no means of 
L.1e1<1inc; that assignment of error. ~State y • .l'J.l.ci<.f'.r, 657 P.2d 
ilt2h 1982). 
As for the other questions, nenE aFpears to rise to the 
·.·!of prejudicial error. It is r.ot at all clear that the 
·t1or: ccncerning a fuel explosion posed to a defense "''itness 
had expertise in "air exchange" was asked "sim1:ly to imply 
·.: the witness had no expertise,• as defendants allege. 
·<'llants' Brief at 48. Such a conclusion is not warranted based 
the context in which the que[tion w~E asked. Furthermore, 
Urat the question was never answerec due to another 
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objection by defendants which was sustained, the witness nevE.r 
exposed any lack of expertise in the c.rea. l'riC, the jury wc:s r«•t 
likely to infer that from the question alone (R. 1837-38) 
(Appendix Cl • 
The question to an insurance adjuster about whether 
defendants had ever been told that they could clc:im i terns on their 
proof-of-loss statement that were not in their house <lt th<- tir.'( 
of the fire appears to have been proper sir.CE evicJence had beu, 
presented that numerous items listed on that statement had not 
been recovered in the remains of the fire (R. 1513, 1622-24, 
1647). 
Finally, although allowing the prosecutor to ask 
Kimberly Nickles whether she hacJ Llirown her pom-Foms over the 
neighbors' fence was probably improper, the question was 
relatively insignificant and likely had little effect on the 
jury's decision. 
Based upon the foregoing discussion of defendants' 
allegations of error, reversal of their convictions is not 
warranted on the basis of any individual error or on a theory of 
cumulative error. Because the trial court ccn~ittee no errors or, 
at most, committed harmless error, defendants' convictions should 
be affirmed. £e..e Bc:wku. v. Hcl..f', 644 P.2d 111, ll3 (Okl. Cr. 
1982) (holding that where there is no individual error, there can 
be no error by accumulation); St9te y. l"cFenzie, 608 P.2d 428, 448 
(Mont. 1980), ~ • .de.n..i.e.J:1, 449 U.S. 1050; United States y. Botr, 
581 F.2d 1294, 1304 (8th Cir. 1978), ~. ~. 439 U.S. 958. 
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POrnT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE DEFENDl.l\TS' REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCT ION CONCERN ING EST HlATES AND 
THE OFFENSE OF Il\SURANCE FRAUD. 
Defendants cortend that lhE trial court erroneously 
refused to give paragraph 5 of Defendants' Requested Instruction 
':,,. 14 (R. 122) (f<prendix Dl. Al though the court instructed the 
;cry on the definition of "estimate" (Instruction No. 19, R. 83, 
;:rfrdi:; Fl, defendants argue that its refusal to include in the 
.r.'truction defining insurance fraud that one of the ele!i\ents of 
the offense was that defencia1,ts' "subr:-.issior.s [to the insurance 
:ompany J were more than 'estimates' , " may have confused the jury 
:c ~uch a dee;ree that a guilty verdict was reached without 
'dficient evidence of criminal conduct. Apparently, defendants 
telieve that under the instructions given the jury may have 
ccrvicted defendants even though they had concluded that the 
! ;a\ues for the i terns def enoant s included in their pr oaf-of-loss 
:t:tei:ient were legitimate estimates of those values. 
However, the court's Instructior: No. 21 adequately 
aucressed defendants' concern. It read: 
You are instructed that an act cor.n.1itted or 
an omissior. made under ignorance or mistake 
of fact which disproves any criminal intent 
is net a crime. Thus a person is not guilty 
of a crime if he acts under an honest and 
reasonable belief in the existence of certain 
facts and circumstanceE l"hich, if true, would 
make such an act or omission lawful. If you 
find that the defendants, or either one, 
because of a reasonable mistake, made certain 
claims upon an insurance company believing 
such claims to be true to the best of his 
knowledse, then you must fine him pot guilty 
of insurance fraud. 
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(R. 85). Given the content of that instruction, defendants were 
not prejudiced by the court's refusal to give paragraph 5 of their 
requested instruction. The substance of defendants' requested 
instruction was contained in Instruction No. 21. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW 
TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE CONFLICT 
OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE DEPUTY 
COUNTY ATTORNEY WHO PROSECUTED THEIR CASE. 
As noted by defendants, on June 12, 1983, this Court, 
pursuant to stipulation of the parties, remanded defendants' case 
to the trial court for a supplemental proceeding on the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct CR. 166). At a hearing held on April l 
and 7, 1983, in the trial court before Judge James S. Sawaya, who 
did not preside over defendants' trial, the following facts were 
established. 
Michael Christensen, who prosecuted the State's case 
against defendants, had been employed by the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office since 1976 CR. 2426, 2437). He began handling 
arson and insurance fraud investigations and prosecutions for that 
office in February 1979, prosecting approximately nine arson cases 
over a four year period (R. 2437). He had received formalized 
training in arson and insurance fraud investigation from the 
National Fire Academy and taught classes in arson for profit for 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ( "ATF") < R. 2 43 8) . 
In June or July of 1980, the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office received a federal grant to establish a county--
wide arson task force ("task force") (R. 2439). Mr. Christensen 
became the lead prosecutor for the task force. His 
-36-
responsibilities ranged from investigation at the fire scene, to 
,ssuance of subpoenas, to screening of cases for prosecution (R. 
;141-42). The entire task force investigated the fire that 
occurred at defendants' home on October 30, 1980 (R. 2450). Mr. 
Christensen, along with other task force personnel, reviewed the 
:ase for possible criminal charges (R. 2452). An information 
:narging defendants with aggravated arson and insurance fraud was 
::Jed on June 30, 1981 (R. 19, 2452, 247 9). 
In late March 1981, Mr. Christensen, his wife, and Jim 
Ashby formed a private corporation called Arson and Fraud 
Investigations, Inc. ("AFI") CR. 2456-57). The corporation was 
designed primarily to provide jobs in arson investigation for 
several employees of the county attorney's arson task force who 
:.ad been advised that their jobs would terminate on June 1, 1981 
R. 2460). AF! investigated fire scenes to determine cause and 
:rigin. It performed approximately eight investigations in Idaho, 
•yoming, and Utah, generally for insurance companies or insurance 
;d'usters CR. 2468-72, 2492). Mr. Christensen personally 
participated in a number of these investigations (R. 2465-73). 
Although Mr. Christensen did not tell Ted Cannon, the 
3alt Lake County Attorney, about AF! when it incorporated, he 
1 ;~ormed Mr. Cannon of AFI and its activities after the latter 
>nquired about the matter in May 1981 CR. 2473). John T. Nielsen, 
'.hief Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, testified that it was his 
Jnderstanding that Mr. Cannon asked Mr. Christensen to 
:!sassociate himself from AF! in June 1981 (R. 2488, 2491-92). 
'fi ceased doing business in September 1981; however, Mr. 
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Christensen did testify in a Boise, Idaho criminal case pursuant 
to subpoena in February 1982 about an investigation conducted bj 
AF! prior to September 1981 (R. 2486-87). A.FI filed articles of 
dissolution on December 8, 1982 CR. 2488). 
According to Mr. Christensen, most of AFI's 
investigations were conducted in Idaho and Wyoming to avoid the 
potential conflicts of having investigators testify in Salt Lake 
City area arson cases CR. 2481). All of the work Mr. Christensen 
performed on defendants' case between October 1980 and June 1981 
was performed in his capacity as a deputy county attorney <R. 
2482-83). During his investigation of this case, Mr. Christensen 
never concealed any evidence or advised anyone connected with the 
case to conceal evidence (R. 2484). 
At the close of the hearing, defendants moved for a new 
trial on the grounds that they were deprived of due process and 
equal protection of the laws due to the appearance of or actual 
existence of a conflict of interest on the part of Mr. Christensen 
because of his involvement with A.FI CR. 168-72, 176-77, 2525-32). 
Although the trial court's decision on that motion is not in the 
record on appeal, the court apparently denied the motion. 
According to defendants, the court did so because the motion was 
untimely and for the further reason that it was meritless. 
Appellant's Brief at 26. For purposes of responding to 
defendants' argument on appeal, the State will assume that 
defendants have accurately stated the basis upon which the courL 
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denied their motion. 6 
Because the State stipulated to the supplemental 
,roceeding conducted before Judge Sawaya, it would not be 
:ons1stent now to argue that defendants' motion for a new trial, 
,~1 ich arguably was necessary to preserve the conflict of interest 
·ssue for appeal, was untimely and therefore that issue should not 
,,~considered by the Court. The State will address the merits of 
;dendants' motion. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-1.2 (2d ed. 
:9801 states that "[al prosecutor should avoid the appearance or 
reality of a conflict of interest with respect to official 
i,ties.• 7 UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-16-4(4) (1978) provides that "[nlo 
p1bl1c officer or public employee shall ••• [alccept other 
err.ployrnent which he might expect would impair his independence of 
1dgment in the performance of his public duties." Under these 
r<les, a deputy county attorney who is involved with a private 
6 The State, subsequent to the filing of this brief, will file a 
motion to supplement the record with the trial court's decision 
on defendants' motion for a new trial. 
The commentary adds: 
Standard 3-2.3(b) recommends that the offices for chief 
prosecutor and staff be full-time occupations. The commentary to 
that standard points out that a conflict of interest may arise 
from part-time devotion to the duties of public prosecutor. The 
.nstant standard complements this provision. 
When the possibility of a conflict of interest arises, the 
~DHcutor should recuse himself or herself and make appropriate 
arrangements for the handling of the particular matter by other 
counsel in accordance with the principles contained in this 
rc 0 pter. • It is of the utmost importance that the prosecutor 
dio1a participation in a case in circumstances where any 
lmplica ti on of par ti al i ty may cast a shadow over the integrity of 
'.~e off ice. 
*See standard 3-2.10. 
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corporation that investigates possible arson and insurance fraud 
cases for insurance companies should not also be representing thP 
state in the prosecution of those types of cases, even though the 
private investigations are conducted outside of the county in 
which he is a prosecutor. This is so because of the appearance of 
a conflict of interest. As observed in People y. Superior Ct. of 
Contra Costa Cty., 19 Cal.3d 255, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 
1164 (1977): 
Thus not only is a judicial requirement 
of prosecutorial impartiality reconcilable 
with executive discretion in criminal cases, 
it is precisely because the prosecutor enjoys 
such broad discretion that the public he serves 
and those he accuses may justifiably demand 
that he perform his functions with the 
highest degree of integrity and impartiality, 
and with the appearance thereof. One of the 
reasons often cited for the institution of 
public prosecutions is that "Americans believed 
that an officer in a position of public trust 
could make decisions more impartially than 
could the victims of crimes or other private 
complainants," persons who often brought 
prosecutions under the older English system 
of criminal justice. (Miller, Prosecution 
(Am. Bar Foundation 1969) p. 295; see 
Meister y. People, Cl875) 31 Mich. 99, 
103; 3 Holdsworth, A History of English 
Law (7th ed. 1956) p. 621, 9 Holdsworth, 
i.d., pp. 241, 244-45.l This advantage 
of public prosecution is lost if those 
exercising the discretionary duties of 
the district attorney are subject to 
conflicting personal interests which 
might tend to compromise their 
impartiality. In short, the prose-
cuting attorney "'is the representative 
of the public in whom is lodged a 
discretion which is not to be 
controlled by the courts, or ~ 
interested individual• • • • In 
(Italics added.) (United States y, Cox, 
supra, 342 F.2d at p. 192.l 
-40-
56 1 P.2d at 1172 (footnote omitted). The California Supreme 
ourt further noted: 
The preservation of prosecutorial 
impartiality is perhaps most important 
during the charging process, the phase 
of a criminal proceeding when the 
prosecutor's discretion is most apparent. 
As the court in Pelli._rino noted, "the 
theme which runs throughout the criminal 
procedure in this state is that all 
persons should be protected from having 
to defend against frivolous prosecutions, 
and that one major safeguard against 
such prosecutions is the function of 
the district attorney in screening 
criminal cases prior to instituting a 
prosecution." (Fn. omitted) (27 Cal. 
App.3d at pp. 205-206, 103 Cal.Rptr. 
at 654.) Surely an essential aspect 
of this safeguard must be the prosecutor's 
freedom from any personal or emotional 
involvement in a controversy which might 
bias his objective exercise of judgment. 
161 P.2d at 1172 n.8. 
The State must concede that, given the appearance of a 
conflict of interest, Michael Christensen should not have been 
the attorney assigned to investigate, file charges in, and 
?rosecute defendants' case. However, the critical issue is 
·~~er under the circumstances defendants are entitled to a new 
c·1al based upon this apparent conflict of interest. 
In Wri._bt y. United States, 732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 
1984), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently outlined a 
scaled approach to the review of prosecutor ial conflict of 
<nterest claims: 
We note in passing that a lesser showing 
may warrant disqualification of a prosecutor 
rather than dismissal of an indictment. See 
generally United States y, Heldt, 668 F.2d 
1238, 1274-78 CD.C.Cir.1981), ~. ~, 
456 U.S. 926, 102 s.ct. 1971, 72 L.Ed.2d 
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440 (1982). Indeed, we think that the 
degree of prosecutorial misconduct of the 
sort here in question and the degree of 
prejudice to the defendant necessary to 
justify action by a reviewing court 
steadily increase as the case goes forward, 
with the least being required on a motion 
to disqualify, somewhat more on a pretrial 
motion to dismiss an indictment, still 
more on a motion in the district court 
after conviction but before appeal, some-
what more on a direct appeal, and as will 
be developed below, a good deal more on 
collateral attack. 
732 F.2d at 1056 n.8. In United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 
(D.C. Cir. 1981), ~ . .de.n.i.eJl, 456 U.S. 926 (1982), the court 
stated: 
Given the need to promote the appearance of 
justice, a trial court on timely motion 
should disqualify a prosecutor from 
participating in a criminal action when he 
has a personal conflicting interest in a 
civil case. The question we face here, 
however, is the very different one of what 
should be done when defendants have failed to 
move to disqualify on the ground of a 
conflict of interest, yet assert a denial of 
due process on appeal. ~ Magjuka y. 
Greenberger, 46 A.D.2d 867, 362 N.Y.S.2d 162, 
163 <1974). We must reconcile the 
governmental interests in conserving judicial 
and prosecutorial resources and in preserving 
the appearance of impartiality with the 
interest of the defendant in receiving fair 
and evenhanded treatment from his accusers. 
We believe the best resolution is to require 
in such circumstances that the defendants 
prove actual prejudice. .!:.f...._ United States y. 
Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 559-60 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(actual prejudice standard applied where 
prosecutor testified before grand jury}, 
~. ~. 444 u.s. 1032, loo s.ct. 703, 
62 L.Ed.2d 668 (1980). With regard to an 
appearance of conflict on the part of the 
prosecution, on appeal a defendant has cause 
to complain only if he was prejudiced. ~ 
People y, Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 281 N.E.2d 
167, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1972). To the extent 
he might receive relief from a prosecution 
solely on a showing of potential prejudice, 
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he would be the undeserving beneficiary of a 
rule that attempts to promote the public 
good. In our judgment the strong 
governmental interest in expedient 
proceedings justifies a rule that gives the 
defendants on the facts of this case relief 
only if they can demonstrate prejudice; 
otherwise, the convictions will stand. 
f,G f.2d at 1277 (footnotes omitted). This approach should be 
100 pted in Utah. It is consistent with other decisions from this 
:oJrt that an issue that has not been properly preserved for 
ifpeal in the lower court will be reviewed on appeal only when 
,an1fest injustice would occur in the absence of review. .s.e..e_, 
~' State y, Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81-2 (Utah 1983). 
Applying the above standard of review to the instant 
ase, where defendants did not move to disqualify the prosecutor 
·11 the ground of conflict of interest prior to or during trial, 
,et assert a denial of due process and equal protection on appeal, 
iefendants must show actual prejudice in order to receive a new 
·11al. On appeal, defendants effectively limit their argument for 
i new trial to the appearance of a conflict of interest on the 
00rc of the prosecutor. .s..e_e Appellants' Brief at 30 ("There is no 
•d':' to know for sure what impact the dual positions Mr. 
:·.tistensen held had on his prosecutorial decisions in this 
ise."). They make no showing of actual prejudice, and, from a 
.enew of the record, they appear to have suffered none. Al though 
:endants properly would have prevailed on a motion to disqualify 
Christensen prior to trial based upon the appearance of a 
· 'lict of interest, they are not entitled to a new trial, given 
':ontext in which that issue was presented to the trial court 
is now presented to this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendants' 
convictions and sentences should be affirmed. 
RESPEC"rFULLY submitted this ;20~of May, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
~~ -:5.~---A-~~-' 
DAVE B. THOMPS-;;vt...#~-<'~ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE cour-;n SALT LAKE DEPARTMEr-;T 
Is~~t~ t· ~ Christensen 
TI-if STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
$) ~,n,~, 00 R i charc~ 
BAIL Sl51Ji 00 !-hq·arE r 
Judgo: 
RICHARD HATFIE'._D NICKL.ES ~ '19 3' INFORMATION 
MARGARET KAY NICKLES ,g ~ '33 
Defend.mt 1s1 
(AddHSS DOBI 
Cnm1no/ No 
~ __ H.'-1\.J 
(;c-?/ /_?/? 
Theunders1gned John l!ngrjcbr 
under oath states on information and belief that the defendants commrtted the crimes of 
COL~;~ I 
AGGRA\'ATED AR.So~;, a second degree felonv. at 4448 Crest 
OaY Drive, on or about October 31, 198"), in violatior. 
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, l'!:a~ Corle Annota:eC, 
1953 as amended, ir, that the defcndan:s, RICH.A?~ H.ATfIEl...=i 
NICKLES and HARGARE; KAY NICf'.:..Eo bv means of fire and/ 
or explosion intentionally and unlawfullv damaged a 
habitable structure, or that acting with the required 
mental state for the car.:w.ission of said offense did 
solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionall:» 
aid another person to engage in conduct to intent10n-
al lv and unlawfully damage said habita~le structurP 
located at 4448 Crest Oak Drive in Salt Lake Co~nt\' 
State of Ctah . 
coc:n 11 
INSL'RAf~CE FRAL'D, a second degree felony, at 4448 Crest 
Oak Drive, on or between October 30, 1980 and Fe~ruar·: 
10, lg Al, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Secti·:m 
521, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the 
defendants, Richard Hatfield Nickles and his wife. 
Margaret Kay Nickles, either as principals to said 
~ 
" ' I 
' 
) ~ ,-\ 
~ \, " 
crime or acting with the 0ental state required for the 
commission of the offense of insurance fraud did di-
rectlv commit said offense, did cau:;c to be presented. 
or did solicit request, command, encourage, or inten-
tionally aid each other or anot~r person to present or 
cause to be presented, any false or fraudulent clai~. 
"' ' ) ~ '\.. 
~\~< 
or anv proof of loss in support of any sue'!-. cl!i!J.. 
upon a contract of insurance with the~!tF~~s=f. ... ~'r'l'I...__, ;-,,,,...___ 
Insurance Company for the payment of fire losses 
purporteC]v sustained bv said defendants on a fire 
that occurred on October 30, 1980 to the defendants' 
residence and contents located at 4448 Crest Oak Drive --?-
(continued on Page two) 
This informat1on lS based on eVl 
dence obtamed from the foUowmg 
wrtnes~ r I L 
Olin Yearby 
Jim Ashhv 
Ra 1 p~. To Irr.an 
John '1'in1chin0 
Dave Magana 
Jack L1ngr1c>--t 
Jerrv Ta .. ·l('r 
Steve Roberts 
3 u 
(cont' on paf-e four) 
C1rcu11 Judge 
\, 
'\ \ 
' 
1~ 
1 
f !1 .J T.-. 
J:;; c'C. 
:,'.,-,'t· \._._, .l-•:,t1,\~- 1,,:.-;fIL:.'. ~;lLt·_:__[~-
1n Salt Lake (c-,',_]Jjt_V, b._•t!-', dtfer.dan:.:.s kn.~· ... int sct::.~ ~"1:..:--:-
or pu-1L'fs in sup:'ort of said c~c.:..'."'."c.5 1 ... 'E·rL fa:sE- er ra .... ,::~~c:-.:.. 
and that the va!ue of said fals~ or fraJdJlent cla cs 
exceeded $1.0 00 in Vdlue, 
PXOBABLE CAUSE STATEl".E';~ On October 31, JO at 0121 hc•cr, 
a fire alanr. was received bv Salt Lake Cc·wn~·" fire De;-'t fr_-r a 
single fa~ily dwelling loca~ed at 44~8 Crest 0d~ Drive in Sa~t 
Lake County, State of L1tah The residence, a t'·rlck and fra::,t 
split-level structure at the time of tne fire was listed on the 
deed as O\.JTled by the defendant n.argaret K Nic!-des Said 
residence, at the time of the fire. was insure~ b·: Trans~ester~ 
Insurance, 440 South SO·J East in Salt Lah· Co·..1ntv Co\•era.:-e 
of the residence included structur·a: covera2e for fire los; 
$268,00J. arpurtenant structural coverage S~b.8n.·1. pers2nd~ 
property luss coverage $1}". •. 0C>O. loss cf use coverat:t:' $53,t-::1 ·, 
and a special loss rider for furs $3, 80CI. Tht- pc:icy n'._llT~'er 
is HD-752-91-5-4 When the fire was initiallv disco':ered. it 
was preceded by a severe explosion that ble~ out the ~ind0~s 
and doors to the residence Anal\'sis of ex:-ilosion debris in-
dicated no fire or smoke dar.iagtc prier to io;i i..r:-.e;i tht:: 
fire crews responded, they cot.:lC observe a invol'.'ed 
structural fire when they cleared the station at 1 25 a m._, 
and upon their arrival at 1 28 a rr., fire crews observed intense 
bun1in[ in all parts of the house The reside-nee at the ti:;ie of 
the fire was W1:Jccupied, the defendants a'ld their farr.ily P'Jr-
portedly being in California Affiant and Capt Dave !'~af_a:-'.a, 
both trained arson investigators. along with the Salt La~e 
County Arson Strike Force, upon the cocrpletion of the fire 
combat, began an ir.unediate scene search for cause and or1,?1r. 
folil1d throughout the home were ''trailer'' pattens indicative of 
a large quantity of flammable substance having been poured 
throughout the house, substances of which were analyzed by ATF 
and found to be similar to Methl-Ethvl Ketone and Acetone. 
both substances that are cormoon to uSage with the fibre-glass 
business The defendant, Richard Nickles, O"!,.,"!led a hoat bus:.ness 
and had been extensively involved in fibre-glass production of 
boat molds Large quantities of Acetone were foWld inside 
closed sui teases positioned underneath the stairway leading to 
the basement, and a plastic container with Acetone was folIDd 
directly under clothing and purported furs contained in a cedar 
clothes closet Found in the basement bedroom. positioned to 
the rear of the structure and not readilv obser\·a~le from the 
streets next to the residence, arson inv€stigators found a;1 
incendiary device described basically as a large wattage lig~t 
bulb, connected to a lamp that did not have an on-off switc~. 
the bulb having been wrapped in newspaper and placed inside a 
plastic photo developer-type tray This device was sent to the 
ATF labs in San Francisco and their experts determined said 
device to be of the type used by arsonists to start fires 
The compnnents of the de\'ice were reconstructed using ne.,,.; 
materials. and tests nm bv arson investigators and ATF expe:r:::s 
to determine the times during which an ignition of the st.:.rround:..:1f: 
newspaper and materials would take place once the lamp had 
electrical power placed to it 
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Times to ignition, depending on the wattage of the light bulb 
ranged at approximately 8-10 hours, .,.;hi ch would be sufficient 
tiwe for defendants to establish an alibi of being in Califot111a 
There l.lere no signs of vandalism and 1 or rllIIIlilaging through 
personal contents indicative of theft 
On December 30, 1980 and in accompanying insurance state-
ments, the defendants submitted their insurance proofs of loss 
to the insurance company which totalled $444,489 88 of losses 
to structural and contents losses. Among the many items clair..td 
that were not fol.D1d in the structure after the fire was $17,000 
in silverplate and sterling silver plates and dishes. In 
comparing the defendants' inventory of property with where the 
defendants claimed they purchased same, investigators could not 
find any records to indicate that the defendants had ever pur-
chased the items claimed Dollar amounts on these iterr~ were in 
excess of $20,000 in false claims 
The defendants had listed the residence for sale on three 
separate occasions, with the first listing on May 15, 1980 ~ith 
Sugarhouse Realty No offers were ever made on the house prior 
to the fire. Several second mortgages were taken out against 
the property after the sales listing, with payments on the second 
mortgage alone costing $1375 per month with that representing 
interest only, and a balloon payment at the end of six months 
for $75,000, said balloon payment to have been due Februar:,;r 22, 
19 81 
Defendants, prior to the fire, were behind on their pa:rments. 
and on one occasion defendant Richard Nickles actually stopped 
payment on the check Three days prior to the fire, the stop 
payment notice on the $1375 was received by his bank Reason for 
stop payment was ''to pay off loan in full". Only $1..375 to date 
has been paid on this $75,000 second mcrtgage 
On November 4, 1930, the defendant Richard !Hckles took a 
polygraph test as to his involvement with setting the fire 
including a question "did he take part in or cause fire to be 
set". The defendant showed deception as to all questions involving 
his participation in and/or knowledge of the fire 
Defendant Richard Nickles has had two prior fires, one of 
which occurred at his boat plant on 2100 South in 1972 in which 
arson was determined as the cause and "trailers" and large 
quantities of Acetone were used to set the fire Defendant. 
at that time, collected approximately $165,000 in insurance 
proceeds from that fire In a boat fire that occurred in 
July, 1979, defendant Richard Nickles collected $70,000 in 
insurance proceeds from that fire Both defendants participated 
in the preparation of the insurance claim and proof of their 
individual alibis. 
The first mortgage on the Crest Oak residence had only 
approximately $13,000 owing Realtors employed by the !lickles' 
stated that the sales price was over-stated by defendants, and 
the property appraised at $100,000 less than it was insured for 
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APPENDIX B 
rnsTRUCTION NO. I c.., 
Before you can convict the defendantsof the crime of 
AGGRAVATED ARSO!l (Count I) 
0 ~ must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all 
f the following elements of that crime 
1 That on or about the 30th dav of October, 1980, 
- Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Richard Hatfield Nickles and 
~r?aret Kav Nickles, either: 
a. intentionally and unlawfully damaged a 
structure by fire and/or explosion, or 
b. acting with the required mental state for 
the corrnnission of said offense did solicit, request, 
command, encourage. or intentionallv aid another 
person to engage in conduct to intentionally and 
unlawfully damage a structure by fire and/or 
explosion. 
2. That said structure was a habitable structure. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
;·cue; 1 it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence has faird to so establish one or morl' "r 
said 
111 vi> 
elements then you find the defendant not guiltv. 
INSTRL'CTIO~ NO. / ~ 
°i'·''• are instructed that every person, acting v:i r:·. the ment2l 
., required for the commission of an offense '-<'ho directlv cOTTLl..i:s 
:;'fense, who solicites, requests, conr.ands, encourages, or inte:c-
~allv aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes 
rfense shall be criminally liable as a party for s~c~ cond~=t 
rnsTRUCTION NO. I~ 
Before you can convict the defendants of the crime of 
INSURANCE FRAUD (Count II) 
,cu must find fror.i the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all 
of the following eler.ients of that crime 
1. That on or between October 30, 1980, and February 
:o, 1981, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said 
Richard Hatfield Nickles and Margaret Kay Nickles, either· 
a presented or caused to be presented a false 
or fraudulent insurance claim to American National 
Fire Insurance Company for payment of a loss 
covered by insurance; or 
b. solicited, requested, cormnanded, encouraged, 
or aided each other or another person to present, 
or cause to be presented, a false or fraudulent 
claim, or any proof of loss in support of any 
false or fraudulent claim to American National 
Fire Insurance Company for payment of a loss 
covered by insurance. 
2. That the said Richard Hatfield Nickles and Margaret 
Kay Nickles acted with the intent, or knowingly, to defraud 
3. That the value of the proper°fy falsely or fraudelently 
:laimed exceeded $1, 000. 00. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
'-
1 of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doi~t. it is your dutv to convict the defendant. On the other 
c.and, if the: evidence ha1{~//f-d to so 
saiJ elements then you find the 
establish one· or· niorc· 
defendant not ~uiltv 
" I 
T' ·c=-~ "fc-a,_;d" or "fraudu~cnt" ir. the ccntext cf 
an instance or act of trickery or dccei:, an 
c ~._ ;;:E~. 1 ;, or ar. int cntional misre;:oreser;tation for the 
e _; in~~=~n~ an0thcr in re:iance upon it to part 
~xccss~ve is defined as characterized by or pres~nt 
,~ s <: ~) c: :-: c: c e :: :._ n g th e us ua 1 , pro;) er , or r.:::: ::-:--:--. a 1 
Excessi\'e descri~Jes v:;1atc·.:cr :.c:a.'ui~,.· 
._, :-~.c re.J~ ~':iablc, US'__lCJ.l, proper, necessary, just cir 
•_,. : ~ 
''Estimate" is defined as an opinion, a rough or approximate 
,:~,;'.acion of the cost of an itec:i. 
---
How <],, you explain that? 
A. 2.3 times is an air exchange regardless of 
whci!'s inside the house. That is inherent property of that 
, 1 11cular structure due to the way it was built. 
If there has been testimony that upstairs is 
chanJiny the acetone quantities P1uch more readily than the 
lowrr areas, if we could sustain a fuel explosion down 
M?. BROl-l:-; : Aroume'1tati\'e. 
MR. CHRISTI:NSE'.'l: He's rendering the opinion. 
MR. BROWN: It's beyond this man's ~xprrtise. 
rr ""· he is is an engineer relati\'e to the air exchange itself., 
,, We' 11 ha\'C another witness on the other aspect. 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: stipulate that it's beyond 
q his exrertise, your Honor, but I asked a specific question 
He has been testifying about fuel-air exchange 
anJ his explanation should be the same regardless of upstair~ 
c1~ dc1v.:r.stairs. think it's appropriate to ask this I expert --
'2 r1c is an expert. 
THE COl'RT: The obJection will be overruled. 
(By Mr. Christensen) Go ahead. 
A. Could you repeat the question? 
\I Yes. There has been testimony that a fuel-air 
ex~. >ton occurred downstairs in the Nickles' residence but 
w~s no e\'idence of that upstairs in the Nickles' 
:er.ct-. 
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A. Yes. 
Q Hov.· do you explain that in terms of the 
.. •:. har:'jC of air that has taken place in that house? 
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I'm going to obJect 
to that again on a different ground afte1 he rephrased the 
que~tion because there is evidence that there was an 
exj·losion upstairs as well as dov.·nstairs and that's 
"·ls J ea d l ng . 
THE COURT: The obJection will be sustained 
'O as to the form of the question. 
11 MR. CHRISTENSEN: No further questions of this 
i2 v.11tness. 
'l'HE COURT: 
MR. BROWN: 
Anything further of this witness? 
Nothing further of this witness, 
lo vour Hu nor, 
1· 
/Ir 
/I 
THE COURT: You may be excused, Mr. Aalam. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you, 
THE CLERK: Would you raise yo·,ir right hand, 
You do solemnly swear the testimony you 
ilre about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
c0th1nu but the trath, so help you God? 
DIANA NICKLES: I do. 
MR. BROWN: Perhaps, your Honor, rather than 
i11q Diana testify at this time, we' 11 ha·:e a different 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the Defendant, Richard H. Nickles, of 
C'l inir of INSURANCE FRAUD, you must find from the evidence, 
n1 a reasonable doubt, all of the followina elements of that 
That on or about the 30th day of October and the 30th day 
Derember, 1980, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said 
~_r1ard H. Nickles did present or cause to be presented a false or 
•raudulenl insurance claim to Great American Insurance Comoany for 
r·e/rnent of a loss covered by insurance; and 
2. That the said Richard H. Nickles acted with the intent, 
:r knowingly, to defraud. 
3. That the value of the property falsely or fraudulently 
:ldirned exceeded $1,000.00. 
4. That there was a contract of insurance in effect at the 
:.1me the purported claim was filed. 
5. That said submissions were more than "estimates". 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of 
c~e essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
is your duty to convict the Defendant. On the other hand, if the 
e·:1de:ice has failed to so establish one or more of said elements 
ueyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the De fend ant not qui 1 ty. 
